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Executive Summary
Aims of project: 
This report is intended as a counterpoint to the British government’s recent 
EU Balance of Competencies Review, which was commissioned to explore 
the areas in which the EU benefits the UK. The review drew attention to some 
of the benefits which the UK gains from European security cooperation, and 
areas in which the EU has failed to fulfil expectations but it stopped short 
of exploring how British security could draw greater benefit from the EU, 
and how the EU’s security shortcomings could be overcome. Therefore, this 
report aims to 1) provide an argument of why the security of the UK and 
its interests vitally depends on both protecting and increasing its level of 
military cooperation through the EU and 2) propose methods to improve the 
EU’s security institutions and so maximise their benefit to British security.
EU benefits to national defence: 
NATO still provides the UK with the best assurance against state-based 
military attacks. However, NATO has very limited responses to non-
conventional security threats, such as terrorism and cyber-attacks. NATO 
lacks the EU’s civilian defensive tools, derived from its judicial, economic 
and social institutions. With the US decreasing its involvement in European 
security, NATO is becoming increasingly European, and so the gap between 
its military capabilities and those of the EU members is closing. Therefore, 
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the UK should place greater emphasis on 
EU-led non-conventional defence initiatives. 
EU benefits to external operations: 
1) The UK and NATO’s failures in recent 
interventions can be largely attributed to the 
lack of civilian involvement in constructing a 
stable and decent government with minimal 
adverse effect on the civilian population. To 
avoid NATO’s mistakes in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the UK should make greater use of the 
EU’s crisis management tools, which allow 
for more diverse and integrated responses. 
2) To fill the European ‘capability gaps’ 
which are opening due to the US’s steady 
withdrawal of military support for Europe, 
the UK must encourage other EU members 
to develop their armed forces, for which 
the EU has specialised institutions such as 
the European Defence Agency (EDA). 
3) The EU also offers the UK a veil of 
legitimacy and acceptability for pursu-
ing its foreign policy owing to its softer, 
value-driven, image and comparatively 
amicable relations with other interna-
tional organisations and states. Pursuing 
its security interests through the EU could 
allow the UK the ability to exert its influ-
ence in areas where doing so unilaterally 
or through NATO would be greeted with 
greater international and local opposition.
Necessary EU foreign intervention reforms: 
To improve the EU’s foreign intervention 
capability, UK should 1) help develop a new 
security white paper to minimise disputes 
on when to launch operations, 2) support 
the creation of a specialised and permanent 
EU military headquarters and 3) promote a 
NATO-style ‘directorate system’ whereby 
controversial EU operations could be led 
by small groups of members. To improve 
the EU’s civilian operations, the UK should 
support the creation of 1) a standing pool of 
civilian crisis-response personnel, and 2) an 
analogous protocol to the EU’s military ATH-
ENA mechanism which would allow states 
to bear the cost of civilian crisis response 
themselves, should they not wish to wait for 
the European Commission to allocate funds.
EU benefits to defence economics: 
The EDA can facilitate and, if given greater 
political input and responsibility, encourage 
pooling and sharing of military resources 
to improve Europe’s military efficiency to 
allow cuts to defence expenditure without 
compromising military capability. A ‘Euro-
pean defence semester’ could require states 
to submit their defence budgets to mutual 
scrutiny to ensure cuts are coordinated so as 
to increase efficiency (‘rationalisation’), rather 
than reduce military capabilities. The UK 
should also encourage greater EU joint pro-
curement and development projects and the 
creation of a joint European military indus-
trial base. This would create economies of 
scale in the arms industry and increase scope 
for pooling and sharing, as well as provide 
Europe with greater strategic autonomy.
EU benefits to British global power: 
A more militarily integrated EU is necessary 
for the UK to retain its position as a ‘top-
table power’, which is threatened by the US 
pivot and the rise of the BRIC countries. The 
EU could define itself as a security provider 
for states which are suffering instability to 
allow the UK and Europe a greater degree 
of influence and closer relations with those 
areas, which otherwise might seek assist-
ance elsewhere. Along with France, the UK 
is the most experienced and capable military 
actor in the EU. If the UK were to champion 
EU defence initiatives, it could translate this 
experience into a position of military leader-
ship, which would overall strengthen its 
position within the EU and hence the world.
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Glossary of abbreviations
AU - African Union
BCR - Balance of Competencies Review
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIVCOM - Committee for Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis Management
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy
EDA - European Defence Agency
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy
ESS - 2003 European Security Strategy
EUMC - European Union Military Committee
ISR - Intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance
PSC - Political and Security Committee
SDSR - 2010 UK Strategic Defence and 
Security Review
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers in Europe
WEU - Western European Union
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Introduction 
In the 17th century the French finance min-
ister, the Duke de Sully, proposed to the 
king the creation of a European Federation. 
He envisaged that this organisation would 
maintain peace and law in the continent 
through the use of a common army of 270,000 
men and would be controlled by the ‘Very 
Christian Council of Europe’.[1] Since then, 
many others have proposed a politically 
united Europe with its own European Army, 
although in few European countries has this 
idea been less popular than in the UK. Despite 
what some alarmist europhobes might claim, 
Europe does not have its own army by any 
stretch of the imagination. However, Europe 
does possess many institutions which enable 
and promote military cooperation between 
states, of which the most important two are 
NATO and the Common Security and Defence 
Policy of the European Union (CSDP). 
NATO was created in the early years of 
the Cold War as an American-led alliance 
to protect Western Europe against attack 
by the Soviet Union and has since become 
increasingly institutionalised. After the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has shifted 
emphasis from collective defence onto other 
roles such as counter-terrorism and ‘conflict 
management’. The CSDP, previously known 
as the ESDP, is a body of the EU which acts 
as a mechanism for greater cooperation and 
joint action between EU members on matters 
of defence and (mainly) security. The ESDP 
was created in the 1996 and was intended 
to provide Europe with a greater ability to 
collectively respond independently to crises 
and so alleviate America’s financial bur-
den within NATO. Subsequently, the ESDP 
developed more clearly defined goals and 
methods of implementation and absorbed 
the Western European Union, a largely inac-
tive European defence organisation which 
was declared defunct in 2011. The ESDP was 
renamed to the CSDP in the Treaty of Lisbon 
which strengthened it by creating the post of 
High Representative (effectively an EU foreign 
minister) and more clearly outlining its tasks. 
The CSDP is assisted by several other Euro-
pean bodies, notably the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) whose aim is to improve 
the military capabilities of EU members.
Given its tradition of military self-reliance 
and suspicion of the lands across the Chan-
nel, Britain has always been amongst the 
most reticent European states towards joint-
European military initiatives. When the UK 
has supported European military cooperation 
it was usually a result of practical considera-
tions outweighing its euroscepticism, rather 
than out of devotion to principles of a shared 
European destiny, which have always been 
taken more seriously in France, General De 
Gaulle being one of the idea’s most prominent 
exponents. Instead, the UK has traditionally 
preferred to cooperate with its Anglophone 
allies (especially the USA) and work through 
NATO. The UK has so far mainly supported 
the CSDP for its contribution to the Alliance. 
However, this close security relation with 
the US is becoming increasingly unreliable 
due to America’s much discussed ‘pivot to 
Asia’. So far the US has made little progress 
in pivoting towards Asia; only 2,500 troops 
have been stationed in Australia,[2] and 
plans to send troops to Vietnam have been 
problematic for obvious historical reasons. 
However the recent interventions in Libya 
and Mali clearly demonstrate the pivot away 
from Europe. The US was very reluctant to 
become involved in either conflict, seeing 
North Africa as outside its area of strategic 
interest and so did not take part in the combat 
directly. Instead, the US ‘led from behind’ 
by providing intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) and other logistical 
support, without which Britain and France 
would not have been able to complete the 
operation. As former US Secretary of Defence 
Robert Gates warned at a speech in Brus-
sels in 2011, “future [American] leaders may 
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not consider the returns on US investment 
in NATO worth the costs”.[3] Therefore, the 
UK’s traditional choice between its Atlantic or 
European partners may soon cease to exist.
When the UK evaluates its relationship 
with the EU, military matters are usually 
overshadowed by economic ones. However, 
the British government is aware of the need 
to consider defence as part of the current 
debate on Britain’s future relationship with 
the EU. In July 2012 it launched a ‘Balance 
of Competencies Review’ (BCR) to examine 
Britain’s relationship with the EU and how 
that relationship affects its national interests. 
The review comes at a time when the calls for 
Britain to reverse the process of deeper Euro-
pean integration are louder than ever and so 
the BCR was intended to inform the member-
ship debate. Only one chapter of the Foreign 
Policy Report (one of 32 reports in total) is 
devoted to examining the EU’s contribution 
to British defence and security. The chapter 
concludes that European defence and secu-
rity integration is not sufficiently developed 
for there to be any reason to reduce British 
involvement in the EU in defence matters as 
“there is nothing to repatriate on the defence 
side”.[4] The review also concludes that while 
the “delivery of CSDP could be improved”, 
the CSDP has been overall of some benefit to 
Britain, which “gets out more than it puts in”.
 This paper aims firstly to respond to the 
BCR by offering a competing assessment of 
how the EU and CSDP currently benefit the 
security and defence of the UK. However, 
this paper will also expand upon the BCR by 
evaluating the CSDP’s potential benefit to the 
UK and how that potential could be realised. 
It will be demonstrated that practical consid-
erations and tightly defined national interest, 
rather than notions of a ‘common European 
destiny’, are sufficient to justify a far greater 
embrace of European military cooperation 
than is currently being supported by the UK. 
Four main areas of British security will be 
considered; 1) national defence, 2) foreign 
interventions, 3) increasing efficiency and 4) 
protecting Britain’s global power and influ-
ence. In each case Britain’s current objectives 
and the challenges it faces will be assessed. 
Following this, there will be an examina-
tion of the potential benefits that could be 
derived from seeking to solve the problems 
through greater cooperation within the EU. 
This discussion inevitably draws the utility 
of NATO into question, which shares many 
of the same objectives and capabilities as 
the EU’s CSDP. However, they also possess 
many important differences which makes it 
likely that both will continue to perform some 
functions best and so, contrary to the usual 
‘Altanticism vs. Europeanism’ dichotomy, 
it will be considered how both might play a 
valuable role in the future of British security.
For the CSDP to play a more central role, 
it needs significant reform as in its current 
form it is unfit for purpose in several ways. 
So far the CSDP has achieved only a fraction 
of what it was hoped to and, given that EU 
members in total spend more on defence than 
China and Russia combined,[5] European 
defence currently amounts to far less than 
the sum of its parts. Therefore this paper will 
propose several measures (most of which 
have been called for repeatedly by politi-
cians and academics) that the UK should 
support at the European Council meeting in 
December 2013. These reforms would allow 
the CSDP to become the global security 
actor which it was intended to be, providing 
greater security to both Britain and Europe.
National Defence
Conventional and nuclear defence
Traditionally, the main role of militaries has 
been to defend states against attacks from 
other states. In many parts of the world, such 
as in East Asia or the Middle East, this is still 
a key consideration and so necessitates that 
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states maintain large standing armies, ready 
to repel an attack. Fortunately for Britain, 
this is no longer a pressing concern. Britain 
is fortunate to be situated in a prosperous, 
interdependent and stable region and enjoys a 
close alliance with the pre-eminent global mil-
itary power (as well as several second ranked 
ones). This means that the costs of attacking 
the UK to the attacker are so great that such 
an attack is very unlikely.[6] The days of air-
raid shelters and the home-guard are over. 
Therefore, one could even argue that 
the UK no longer requires armed forces for 
defence against conventional attacks. This 
may well currently be the case but neverthe-
less there is a plausible case for maintaining 
an ‘insurance’ against any unforeseen threat 
in the future. This is the main argument in 
favour of the UK keeping and upgrading its 
nuclear arsenal. The 2010 British Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) also 
states that, although the army is reducing its 
heavy armour and artillery, which are useless 
against the non-conventional threats which 
the UK is mainly concerned with today, it will 
“retain the ability to regenerate those capabili-
ties if need be”.[7] Such measures should more 
than suffice to ensure that the UK is safe from 
state-based conventional (or nuclear) attack 
in the foreseeable future, in the absence of a 
dramatic change in the international order. 
An additional insurance against future 
threats is remaining in collective defence 
alliances which ensure that the UK will 
never be forced to defend itself alone and 
provide a deterrent to potential attackers. 
Since 1949 NATO has guaranteed the UK 
collective defence, as was the organisation’s 
original purpose and, according to its 2010 
Strategic Concept, still “the cornerstone of 
the alliance”.[8] Collective defence is guar-
anteed by article V of the North Atlantic 
Treaty which requires that when a member 
is attacked other members must come to 
its assistance and provide “such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force”.[9,10] So far, article V has never been 
invoked, although it was offered by the US’s 
allies after the September 11th attacks as a 
basis for their assistance in the invasion of 
Afghanistan. However, there is no reason to 
suppose that the UK cannot depend on its 
NATO allies to come to its aid if attacked. 
Britain is so deeply economically linked and 
geographically close to other key NATO 
members that any attack on the UK would 
be equally a huge threat to them, who would 
therefore be unable to ignore such an attack. 
The main value of NATO’s collective 
defence guarantee is the involvement of 
the US, which is still the unrivalled global 
military superpower with technology and 
force-projection capabilities far greater than 
those of the rest of the world combined. 
Although the US has stated its intent to 
reduce its commitment to Europe, there is no 
reason to assume this would lead to a neglect 
of article V commitments. The logic of the 
pivot was to stop the US getting involved in 
conflicts which were only in its allies’ inter-
ests. However, this by no means implies that 
protecting the allies themselves is no longer 
in America’s interest. After initial inaction in 
two world wars, the US realises the foolish-
ness and futility of trying to stay out of wars 
in Western Europe, to which it is today politi-
cally and economically far more connected 
than was the case in the 1910s and 30s.
However, NATO is no longer the sole 
provider of collective defence to the UK. 
Article 42(7) of the Lisbon treaty commits EU 
members to upholding collective security, 
stipulating that all signatories should come 
to the aid of a member under attack “by all 
means in their power”;[11] although this is 
qualified so that the obligations to collective 
defence do not conflict with members’ com-
mitments to neutrality or to NATO. However, 
it is hard to see the extra value which EU 
collective defence brings the UK, compared to 
NATO. The inclusion of the US in NATO gives 
the organisation almost four-times the mili-
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tary budget of the EU’s members and many 
times more fire-power. Even if the US did 
revert back to an isolationist position, remi-
niscent of the inter-war period, this would 
still not leave NATO in an inferior position 
to the EU in terms of providing collective 
defence. As the BCR notes, the EU also lacks 
NATO’s many years of conventional war-
planning and fighting experience and there is 
no agreement over how article 42(7) should be 
implemented.[12] Article 43(1) of the Lisbon 
treaty sets out the military tasks which the 
CSDP hopes to achieve and does not mention 
collective defence or engaging in any conflict 
larger than peacekeeping operations, show-
ing the current lack of serious commitment 
to making the CSDP an alternative collective 
defence provider to NATO. Therefore, there 
is little reason for the UK to propose greater 
EU cooperation on collective defence when 
the EU’s military efforts could be spent in 
areas where they are more likely to be used. 
Cyber-defence
With the absence of a pressing conventional 
or nuclear threat, the SDSR focuses mainly 
on non-conventional threats to the UK, the 
‘top tier’ being terrorism, organised crime 
and cyber-attacks. Given the novelty of cyber-
threats, it is difficult to predict the potential 
damage that they could inflict in the future. 
However, feared actions such such as the 
remote disabling of national power grids far 
exceed any attacks successfully executed on a 
state to date. As it stands, national information 
and communication systems are insufficiently 
integrated to make cyber-attacks a decisive 
method of warfare. However, it is possible 
that cyber-warfare could become a greater 
area of concern in the future. The greater 
cyber threat is towards British commercial 
interests from cyber-criminals and there have 
been many cases of businesses and banks 
losing money to online criminal activity. The 
SDSR provides an example of ‘criminals’ reg-
istering 9,500 Olympic-related web addresses 
before the 2012 games.[13] However, it is not 
clear that such activity should fall into the 
category of national security, rather than law 
enforcement, given how different the nature 
of the threat and appropriate methods of 
response are, compared to armed threats. 
Cyber-attacks have nevertheless sig-
nificantly concerned both national and 
international defence organisations and 
features prominently in NATO’s 2010 Strategic 
Concept. Due to the global nature of commu-
nications infrastructure, which allows many 
states to be affected by a single cyber-attack, 
it is logical that the combative measures 
should be similarly international. However, 
the measures to defend against cyber-attacks 
do not necessarily have to be undertaken by 
military organisations like NATO. Cyber-
crime against businesses is a matter of law 
enforcement, rather than national defence. It 
requires coordination with the communica-
tions industry and regulation of security 
systems in both the public and private sec-
tors. Such civilian tasks are better suited to 
the EU which has broad economic and com-
mercial powers, which NATO lacks being 
a military institution. NATO may be better 
suited to dealing with military cyber-attacks 
(or carrying them out against other states) 
but currently this does not represent the main 
types of cyber-threat to the UK. Therefore, 
the UK should give greater support to the 
EDA’s cyber-defence initiative, proposed at 
the November 2012 steering board meeting. 
Counter-terrorism
As with cyber-attacks, terrorism is an interna-
tional threat. Terrorist groups can coordinate 
attacks from positions around the world, 
severely restricting the effectiveness of a 
purely national counter-terrorism response. 
Therefore, international organisations play a 
vital role in the UK’s counter-terrorism activi-
ties. Since the September 11th attacks, NATO 
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has been very active in combating terrorism 
by allowing states to share intelligence and 
security advice. However, NATO’s military 
response in tackling terrorism has been in 
some ways counterproductive, with the wars 
in Afghanistan and Libya exacerbating the 
root causes of terrorism, such as political 
instability and resentment towards the West. 
An effective counter-terrorism strategy must 
address the causes of terrorism and include 
methods such as ‘counter-radicalisation’, 
not just focus on foiling attempted acts. The 
terrorist threat to Europe has roots both 
domestically, from radicalisation of European 
citizens, and externally, from international 
terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda which 
operate from areas of lawlessness. Potential 
methods of addressing the external causes will 
be considered in section 3 on ‘foreign inter-
vention’ and, for now, the focus will be on 
ways to tackle the domestic roots of terrorism.
As former EU High Representative Javier 
Solana stated, “the military option alone 
cannot defeat terror. Judicial, police and 
intelligence cooperation should be the focal 
point for action”.[14] Tackling the domestic 
causes of terrorism requires a very integrated 
combination of legal, educational and social 
measures to increase social cohesion and 
integration to prevent radicalisation, while 
still foiling attempted terrorist acts. Such tasks 
fall largely outside NATO’s area of expertise 
and capability and, like cyber-defence, are 
better suited for the civilian institutions of 
the EU. The EU is also capable of undertak-
ing the low-intensity military aspects of 
domestic counter-terrorist operations through 
the CSDP, such as protecting civilians and 
reacting to terrorist attacks, and so it does 
not require the additional conventional mili-
tary force of NATO. Moreover, compared to 
the civilian institutions, military force has 
a limited utility in the fight against terror-
ism and so, as Solana stated, “[the CSDP] 
is not at the core of our [counter-terrorism] 
efforts”.[15] Any military counter-terrorism 
activities should be carried out in a way 
which does not conflict with civilian ones, 
for example avoiding increased radicalisa-
tion by minimising brutality. Therefore, it 
would be more cohesive for the CSDP to take 
over more responsibility from NATO on the 
military side of counterterrorist activities. 
An advantage NATO has over the CSDP 
in counter-terrorism is the inclusion of the 
US. However, the EU has expanded its 
counter-terrorism partnerships with non-
member countries, such the US, with which 
it runs a terrorist tracking program. Any 
NATO counter-terrorism strategy relies on 
cooperation with the EU but such efforts 
(as well as much other potential EU-NATO 
cooperation) are currently blocked by the 
dispute between Cyprus and Turkey over 
the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. 
The two states together wield a ‘double veto’ 
against intelligence sharing between the two 
institutions, which they worry would aid the 
other in their dispute. Cyprus blocks Turkish 
involvement in the EDA and talks between 
the CSDP’s Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) and NATO’s North Atlantic Council, 
the respective executive bodies, which are 
therefore only able to meet informally and 
without a fixed agenda. There is little hope of 
a solution to the impasse in the near future, 
given that negotiations on the Berlin Plus 
agreement between the EU and NATO on 
military equipment sharing took two years 
due to Cypriot and Turkish disagreement. 
To avoid the difficulties of EU-NATO coun-
ter terrorist cooperation, it would be more 
effective for Britain to prioritise the sharing 
of intelligence through EU institutions and 
increase EU-US bilateral cooperation when-
ever possible, to ensure that the intelligence 
can reach civilian counter-terrorism programs.
Furthermore, in order to improve the 
coherence of its counter-terrorist programs, 
the EU needs to have a greater level of 
consensus on the best methods of tackling 
terrorism. This could be achieved through 
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the creation of a common EU counter-
terrorism strategy. However, attempted 
terrorist attacks within the UK are becom-
ing increasingly rare compared to those 
on British citizens and interests overseas, 
which therefore warrant greater attention.
International organised crime
The benefits the UK would derive from 
greater EU cooperation in fighting organised 
crime are very similar to those of combating 
domestic terrorism. It requires an inter-
national approach and a combination of 
law-enforcement and military operations, 
such as those used to prevent people-traffick-
ing in the Mediterranean. The EU and CSDP 
are better equipped for this than NATO due 
to the EU’s ability to deploy a wider range 
of tools that mutually reinforce one another. 
The ways in which the EU can benefit British 
efforts to tackle the causes of international 
crime outside the EU (such as Piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden) will be discussed in section 3. 
Alternative Security
Mentions of ‘alternative security’ are becom-
ing increasingly common in national security 
and defence reviews and include energy secu-
rity, preventing climate change and protecting 
against ‘civil emergencies’ such as floods. 
Britain is fortunate that natural disasters and 
other civil emergencies are extremely rare and 
very small scale compared those in other parts 
of the world. Climate change-related disasters 
are predicted to increase but, unfortunately, 
the effects of climate change will be impos-
sible to defend against without successful 
methods of limiting its causes. Preventing cli-
mate change, although vital to global security, 
bears very little in common with the armed 
security threats which this paper will focus 
on. For the sake of brevity, therefore, environ-
mental security will be treated as a separate 
topic to be discussed elsewhere (although 
there is doubtlessly much to be gained from 
greater EU environmental cooperation).
Like environmental security, Britain’s 
energy security requires scientific solutions as 
much as political ones which places many of 
the possible solutions, such as the potential 
utility of nuclear power and fracking, outside 
the topic of discussion. However, ensuring 
Britain’s energy security does require political 
solutions, such as maintaining good rela-
tions with energy producers and ensuring 
their on-going stability. Significant levels of 
Britain’s energy imports are from poten-
tially unstable countries, such as Algeria 
and Nigeria which together are the source 
of 12% of the UK’s crude oil imports.[16] 
At times it may be necessary to intervene in 
such regions to protect British interests, the 
methods of which will now be considered. 
Foreign intervention
How the EU can help
Most of the UK’s military operations now 
involve deploying only a small number of 
troops in impoverished and war-torn regions. 
The motivations behind such actions are 
varied and often hard to disentangle. Usually 
there is a humanitarian justification, such as 
protecting civilians from civil war or inhu-
mane regimes. Foreign interventions are also 
often justified on the grounds of protecting 
British citizens either in the UK or abroad, 
such as Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone in 
2000.[17] Other interventions are justified as 
protecting British citizens at home by attempt-
ing to tackle the causes of terrorism abroad, 
such as the Afghanistan war. However, it is 
impossible to ignore self-interested motiva-
tions usually also behind interventions, such 
as removing unfriendly regimes to secure 
access for British-owned companies to a 
region, or to maintain stability to protect exist-
ing British commercial or strategic interest 
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in the regions, as was the case with the Iraq 
war. The UK still intends to undertake exter-
nal military operations in the future with the 
SDSR stating that the armed forces should be 
able to engage in three simultaneous overseas 
deployments. Such military operations are 
rarely launched without some sort of accom-
panying civilian operation, such as delivering 
humanitarian aid or nation-building, which is 
usually undertaken by NGOs or international 
organisations such as the UN or EU, through 
the CSDP.  To date the CSDP has launched 
in total 28 external operations, of which 16 
are on-going (12 civilian and 4 military). 
Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show 
that British overseas operations could be 
conducted far more effectively, with many 
being a) ineffective, such as the attempts to 
build a stable and effective government in 
Afghanistan, b) illegitimate, such as the war 
in Iraq or c) too late, such as the intervention 
in Bosnian civil war in the 90s. This section 
will outline ways in which the CSDP could 
help the UK overcome these problems and 
which measures should be taken to improve 
the effectiveness of the CSDP operations.
Civilian involvement 
Military interventions, such as those under-
taken by NATO in Bosnia and Libya, are 
useful for achieving certain specific goals. 
They can quickly deter threats to civilians 
by destroying the potential attackers or by 
simply putting troops between civilians and 
combatants, which may not even require the 
use of lethal force. This can be a necessary 
prerequisite for providing civilian aid such as 
humanitarian assistance. However, military 
force alone has limited utility in external oper-
ations for three reasons. Firstly, as a response 
to armed threats, military intervention is only 
ever a reaction to crises, rather than a way 
of preventing crises in the first place, and so 
can only prevent a limited proportion of the 
suffering. Secondly, as was seen in Afghani-
stan, military force can defeat the enemy in 
combat but doing so is pointless unless the 
recruitment of new enemy combatants can be 
stemmed, to avoid a stalemate. Despite pos-
sessing overwhelming military superiority 
and even making progress in counter-insur-
gency techniques, after over a decade the ISAF 
(International Security Assistance Force) in 
Afghanistan has failed to end the insurgency 
and build a state capable of maintaining 
security within its own borders, having cost 
the UK £37bn[18] and the US over £417bn.
[19] Finally, military force alone cannot ensure 
that peace and stability in a region continue 
after the intervening troops have returned 
home by enabling the state to provide its 
own security in the future. Successfully using 
non-military methods instead of military ones 
can save many lives and spare great costs, as 
well as yielding longer-lasting results. In 2001 
the EU High Representative Solana helped 
broker a peace deal between the Macedonian 
government and the Albania National Libera-
tion Army, which seemed on course for a full 
civil war. By avoiding the need for military 
intervention, the peace deal saved thou-
sands of lives and an estimated £14.7bn[20] 
to European governments upon whom the 
duty of intervening would have fallen. 
Despite apparent British success in end-
ing the civil war in Sierra Leone, which was 
undertaken essentially unilaterally (discount-
ing the vital use of American logistical assets), 
the UK is unable to intervene on a larger scale 
without assistance from allies, especially given 
recent cuts to defence funding and personnel. 
Currently NATO is the UK’s organisation of 
choice for undertaking external operation and 
the SDSR states that the UK would “support 
EU missions – whether military or civilian … 
only where it is clear that NATO is not plan-
ning to intervene”.[21] However, as a military 
body, NATO lacks the nation-building and 
aid-providing capabilities which the EU pos-
sesses and which are critically important. 
One potential solution to NATO’s shortfall 
is increasing the level of cooperation and 
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division of labour between the EU and NATO, 
with NATO undertaking the military aspects 
of operations (the ‘heavy lifting’) and the EU 
managing the civilian side, where its main 
strengths lie. Such an approach was suggested 
repeatedly in the BCR. However, NATO-EU 
cooperation is difficult for the same reasons 
mentioned in section 2c), namely the impasse 
over the Turkey-Cyprus dispute. Occasion-
ally there has been successful cooperation 
between the EU and NATO through the 
‘Berlin Plus’ agreement, which allows the 
EU to use NATO assets, such as in Bosnia. 
However, the cooperation was small scale and 
essentially involved troops replacing their 
NATO badges with EU ones. More recently 
the Turkish-Cyprus dilemma has proved 
very problematic for EU-NATO overseas 
interventions. In Afghanistan there was little 
coordination between the NATO Training Mis-
sion- Afghanistan (NTMA) and the EU Police 
Mission- Afghanistan (EUPOL) police training 
missions, due to the lack of formal EU-NATO 
planning meetings. Therefore, in the absence 
of an effective mechanism for cooperation 
between the EU and NATO, if the UK wishes 
to partake in cohesive civilian and military 
operations it should do so by conducting the 
entire operation through the EU, rather than 
attempt joint action with NATO and the EU or, 
worst of all, by acting solely through NATO 
and neglecting the civilian developmental 
and humanitarian aspects of the operation. 
The ‘capability gap’
Despite globally being the 4th largest military 
spender, the UK has severe capability defi-
ciencies which prevent it from independently 
achieving any but the most modest of its secu-
rity objectives. The most serious deficiencies 
are in intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-
sance (ISR), close air support,[22] UAVs and 
logistical support including transportation 
and air-to-air refuelling.[23,24] These deficien-
cies are even more serious in other European 
countries and are largely a legacy of the 
American-imposed ‘division of labour’ within 
NATO in the cold war, whereby the US would 
focus on ISR, high-tech systems and logistics 
while the European allies would provide 
troops and tanks for the Alliance. This divi-
sion of labour was not problematic in missions 
led by the US, such as in the Balkans, when 
it was able to provide its allies with the tools 
they lacked. However, as part of its ‘pivot’, 
the US is showing decreasing interest in sup-
porting Britain or its other European allies. 
The 2011 Budget Control Act aims to reduce 
American defence expenditure by $450bn over 
the next ten years. These savings will be, in 
part, made by reducing the level of American 
support to its European allies and no longer 
guaranteeing support in conflicts which are 
not in America’s interest. American reticence 
about providing equipment to Europeans 
almost prevented the intervention in Libya 
in 2011, as the European states involved 
were unable to source their own ‘strategic 
enablers’ and therefore had to desperately 
seek assistance from the US, which ultimately 
provided air-to-air refuelling and 90% of 
the smart munitions for the mission.[25] 
There is scope for the CSDP to play an 
important role in helping Britain close the 
‘capability gap’ and ensure it is able to under-
take the military and civilian operations which 
are within its interests. Already there has been 
considerable progress in this area, thanks 
to the work of the EDA which has directly 
addressed the EU’s capability gap and is 
undertaking programs in the areas of air-to-air 
refuelling, satellite communications, maritime 
surveillance and many more. Furthermore, 
the creation of EU battlegroups, rapid expe-
ditionary forces of about 1,500 troops at the 
disposal of the CSDP, has had a positive effect 
on Europe’s armed forces. The EU has a very 
large number of troops, with around 1.7 mil-
lion active personnel and over 5 million total 
military personnel. This significantly exceeds 
the USA and puts it second only to China.[26] 
However, as of 2010 only 28% of that pool of 
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manpower was deployable overseas, falling 
a long way short of NATO’s target of 50%[27] 
(although in 2005 only 15%[28] were deploy-
able overseas, showing encouraging progress). 
This increase is due to the pressure placed on 
EU members to contribute to battlegroups, 
which gives them an incentive to reform 
their armed forces. For example, Germany 
ended conscription in 2011 to ensure that its 
troops were professional enough for over-
seas deployment while the BCR singles out 
Sweden and Spain as having improved their 
armed forces by making them more rapidly 
deployable for overseas military operations.
Improving Europe’s armed forces is of 
special interest to the UK which, along with 
France, is Europe’s leading military power. 
As American experience in Afghanistan 
and Iraq has shown, it is very difficult for 
allies to cooperate when one is vastly more 
technologically advanced than the other. It is 
no longer possible for allies to ‘carve up the 
front’ into sections, allocating each to an ally 
which would fight with tactical independ-
ence, as was done in the Second World War.
[29] Integrated communications systems mean 
that each combatant has to be constantly 
responsive to the entire operation. This is 
impossible when some allies have far more 
rudimental systems and procedures than 
others and this has led to instances of friendly 
fire. Therefore, the UK needs to ensure that it 
does not allow a large gap to fall between the 
capability of its European allies and its own. 
A second lesson to be learnt from the US 
is that being the senior partner in an alliance 
makes one vulnerable to free-riding. If one 
ally performs a role such as ISR vastly more 
effectively than the other, who falls into a 
habit of reliance, it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to end that dependence without critically 
weakening the capability of the junior partner. 
Therefore, the UK should use the EDA to help 
and encourage other EU members to mod-
ernise their armed forces and allow them to 
make meaningful contributions to overseas 
operations. It should also encourage the EDA 
in developing large projects, like satellite 
communications, to help the UK overcome 
its capability gap. As the military forerunner 
in Europe, the UK is well positioned to pro-
vide leadership and expertise in these tasks.
Legitimacy
Many states are understandably uncomfort-
able about the US and Europe’s habit of 
sending troops into other territories. Many 
non-Western leaders see such actions as a 
return to 19th century imperialism, with 
pretence of protecting human rights a mask 
for obtaining access to natural resources and 
markets. Inversely, some authoritarian lead-
ers, such as Russian president Putin, see the 
interest in human rights as a problem in itself, 
due to their own dismal human rights records. 
In 2005 the UN adopted the principle ‘Respon-
sibility to Protect’ (R2P) which states that 
national sovereignty is a responsibility which 
states can forfeit if the leaders subject their cit-
izens to significant harm, such as war crimes, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing. Russia and China are concerned 
that this would give the West an excuse to 
interfere in the affairs of their own countries, 
pointing out that they are very selective when 
it comes to applying R2P and focus only on 
crimes of their enemies while ignoring similar 
ones of their allies. After the 2011 NATO mis-
sion enabled the Libyan National Liberation 
Army to overthrow Gadhafi, which was not 
authorised in its UN mandate, Russia and 
China felt betrayed for their acquiescence 
of the intervention.[30] Therefore, Russia is 
very reluctant to allow Western intervention 
in Syria, for fear of future mission-creep from 
protecting civilians to regime change and, 
being a member of the UN Security Council, 
has the ability to prevent any resolutions 
authorising intervention. Continuing to inter-
vene in crises overseas when it is within its 
interests is important for the UK to promote 
its influence and maintain its credibility as a 
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global power. Therefore, the UK must find a 
way of overcoming such diplomatic obstacles. 
Furthermore, a lack of legitimacy amongst 
the population of a country subject to inter-
vention can make the mission far more 
difficult. In 2003 the US optimistically hoped 
to be greeted in Iraq as ‘liberators’ but after 
failing to win the people’s ‘hearts and minds’, 
they were instead seen as invaders and the 
mission suffered heavily from insurgency. 
The EU can help the UK overcome both of 
these challenges by having a better rela-
tionship with other states and actors than 
NATO and so disguising British interests.
Firstly, despite now having military ele-
ments, the EU is fundamentally a civilian 
organisation, unlike NATO which is run by 
military staff. Although both organisations 
stress very similar commitments to uphold-
ing human rights and democracy, NATO was 
undeniably created primarily out of realist 
consideration as a way of increasing Western 
military power. NATO’s claims to stand by 
certain values are severely undermined by 
consistently putting strategic considerations 
first, having allowed Greece and Spain to be 
members while the countries were dictator-
ships. Turkey is noticeably also a member 
of NATO, despite being an authoritarian 
regime with the highest number of incarcer-
ated journalists in the world[31] and recently 
responding to popular protests of its citizens 
with bloody repression. The US has also 
greatly undermined its identity as a force for 
good in the world with the war on terror, con-
tinuing to conduct unpopular and secretive 
drone strikes in Pakistan, illegally imprison-
ing suspected terrorists in Guantanamo Bay 
and using online surveillance on both its 
own citizens and those of its allies. Although 
similar accusations can be made against many 
members of the EU, especially the UK, they 
are not as severe and do not significantly 
tarnish the reputation of the EU as a whole. 
Due to its part- supranational nature, the EU 
manages to avoid being associated with all of 
the crimes of its members to the same extent 
as an intergovernmental organisation like 
NATO. Consequently, the EU is much more 
credible than NATO when it claims to be 
acting out of humanitarian concerns, rather 
than its own power-maximising interests.[32] 
Therefore, states like China do not consider 
the EU a threat to their interests in the same 
way as the USA or ‘its tool’ NATO, although 
this may also be a result of the Union’s per-
ceived weakness and so could change if it 
starts to assert its interests too aggressively. 
By being much less than an actual state but 
much more than simply a collection of states, 
the EU is not suspected of playing the same 
zero-sum power games as states are often 
assumed to do. This means that EU opera-
tions are less likely to face opposition.
For historical reasons, the EU enjoys a far 
better relationship with Russia than NATO 
does. Russian leaders[33] find interference 
by its cold war enemy in the former-Soviet 
bloc, and especially in the former Soviet 
Union itself such as Georgia, a huge insult 
and challenge to their domestic image of 
power. The value of the EU’s more amicable 
(although far from close) relationship with 
Russia is currently being demonstrated by 
the EU monitoring mission in Georgia which 
was launched in October 2008 to maintain the 
ceasefire between Russia and Georgia after 
their conflict over South Ossetia and Abk-
hazia. So far the mission has helped maintain 
stability in the region, which has avoided 
further conflict and so has been largely suc-
cessful. It is unimaginable that Russia would 
allow troops under the NATO banner (espe-
cially American troops) into Georgia, given 
Georgian interest in joining the Alliance was a 
major cause of the Russian invasion in 2008.
The EU also enjoys a good relationship 
with Africa. This too is partially because, 
without the identity of a state, the EU is seen 
as less likely to engage in interventions out 
of pure self-interest, such as neo-colonial 
scrambles for resources. The EU also has a 
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close relationship with the African Union 
(AU) and coordinates with it in missions 
in Africa, providing it with large levels of 
funding. The EU contributed €500m to the 
AU mission in Sudan in 2005 (AMIS1)[34] 
and €325m to the mission in Somalia.[35] 
Africa is predominantly the EU’s area of 
responsibility for providing aid and promot-
ing security with three of the CSDP’s four 
on-going military operations are in Africa, 
as well as half of the civilian ones. Therefore, 
the close relationship between the EU and 
AU is very important to ensure that mis-
sions in Africa are accepted by both Africans 
and the wider international community as 
being in Africa’s best interests, rather than 
as a return to the exploitative relationship 
between Europe and Africa in the past.
The EU’s positive image makes it a useful 
medium through which the UK can conduct 
aspects of its foreign policy which would be 
viewed with suspicion if undertaken unilater-
ally or with NATO. This increases its scope 
for promoting its interests internationally 
and without damaging relations with other 
powers. The value of the EU’s legitimacy 
can be observed currently with the EU’s role 
in shaping the on-going political crisis in 
Egypt, with the emergency military govern-
ment violently repressing the previously 
ruling Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian 
government is deeply suspicious of states 
intervening in its assertion of authority which 
gives the EU, with its softer ‘value-driven’ 
image a distinct advantage in conducting 
negotiations and allows the UK a method of 
intervening in the conflict (albeit less directly) 
that would otherwise be unavailable.
Necessary reforms
Strategic reform
Western governments have often been criti-
cised for intervening in humanitarian crises 
too late or not at all, examples being the 
Bosnian war and the Rwandan genocide 
respectively. These criticisms are especially 
valid of the CSDP’s record. Despite hav-
ing battlegroups on standby, which were 
tailor-made for such crises, the CSDP did 
not intervene in either the Libyan civil war 
in 2011 or the Mali insurgency in 2013, with 
the burden falling on Britain and France who 
acted through NATO instead. To avoid such 
future embarrassment and meet its responsi-
bilities, the CSDP needs an effective way of 
deciding its top priorities; when and how it 
should act and the means to be allocated to 
such action.[36] National governments do this 
by producing white papers usually labelled 
‘security strategies’, such as the SDSR. A 
security strategy is also necessary to ensure 
that all of the actions of a state or organisation 
are coherent and work towards a single goal, 
rather than being ad hoc and contradictory.
The closest document the EU has ever 
produced to a security white paper is the 2003 
European Security Strategy (ESS). However, 
the obvious problem with the document is 
that it is now a decade out of date; being 
written before financial crisis, before the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars had stagnated 
and generally at a time when the global 
centre of power appeared to be in the West. 
Even at the time of publication, the ESS was 
insufficient to act as an effective guide for 
enabling EU members to respond to crises 
with a common purpose. At only 15 pages, 
the ESS is very short (the SDSR is around 
70 pages) and mainly discusses the threats 
which Europe faces and the general form 
which an approach to these threats should 
take (e.g. ‘multilateral’, ‘preventative’, and 
‘comprehensive’). It does not identify the 
specific objectives of such an approach and 
so, as Sven Biscop says “The ESS tells us 
how to do things, but not what to do”.[37] 
The ESS needs to be replaced by document 
similar to the SDSR, but created through a 
‘top-down process’[38] that includes supervi-
sion and input by the 28 EU heads of state, 
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to lower level staff, as was the procedure with 
the ESS. This would give the new security 
strategy the authority to guide EU security 
policy. It should also give sufficiently detailed 
ways of responding to crises so that, in the 
event of a crisis, any debate between mem-
bers would be limited to details of a potential 
intervention, not whether to intervene at all. 
Obviously, any such strategy should be regu-
larly updated; Biscop suggests that this should 
be done every five years to coincide with the 
appointment new EU high representatives.[39] 
A European security strategy could have 
prevented the EU’s inaction during the Libyan 
and Malian interventions. At the time of the 
Mali crisis in January 2013, the joint German, 
Polish and French Weimar battlegroup was 
on standby and ready to intervene in such 
crises. However, the German government 
was unwilling to see their troops deployed 
overseas. A similar reluctance to use force 
resulted in Germany and Sweden blocking 
an EU intervention in Libya in 2011, when 
it was Swedish troops in the battlegroup on 
standby. However, a new European security 
strategy would give states such as Germany 
the ability to help decide in advance which 
actions the EU should take when crises occur 
in order to serve its priorities. Having agreed 
to such a strategy, it would be much harder 
for a national government to abstain or pre-
vent action in accordance with the strategy. 
Military reform
The EU had high hopes for its battlegroups, 
as did their main creators, the UK and France. 
It is therefore an acute embarrassment that 
they are yet to be deployed, despite having 
become active in 2007. Much of this failure 
can be attributed to a lack of strategic consen-
sus, which a new European security strategy 
would help overcome. However, the decision 
to put your own citizens in harm’s way is 
likely still to be contentious, even with a new 
European security strategy. There will always 
be new crises that, it will be argued, do not fit 
the pattern of any previous ones and so exist-
ing practises should not apply, giving pacifist 
EU members such as Germany scope to veto 
an intervention by the CSDP. In such a case, 
there should be the possibility that certain 
EU members can lead an intervention with 
other states being able to abstain or indirectly 
contributing, for example by taking over other 
security duties from the involved states such 
as airspace policing. This system would be 
similar to that in NATO, which allows groups 
of members to form ‘directorates’ and lead 
military operation while other members are 
allowed to abstain, rather than being forced 
to veto the operation. This approach was 
used in the Operation Unified Protector in 
Libya, which was led by the UK and France 
with Germany abstaining, and is widely 
regarded as a military success. Such a system 
would ‘bridge the gap’ until the foreign and 
security policy of the EU members becomes 
sufficiently integrated that the CSDP does 
not require the consensus of member states to 
deploy battlegroups or, more realistically, the 
consensus of member states can be assumed.
Civilian and organisational reform
So far the success of several of the CSDP’s 
civilian operations has been compromised by 
shortages of personnel, which led to missions 
being simply too small to accomplish their 
objectives. Lack of civilian personnel in the 
EU training missions in Kosovo and especially 
in Afghanistan, which involved around 400 
EU personnel compared to Kosovo’s over 
3000 (despite being a much more challenging 
environment), means that the police forces in 
both countries are still plagued with corrup-
tion and unprofessionalism. The personnel 
shortage is caused by the fact that, unlike 
the military CSDP which draws from the 
standing armies of EU members, the CSDP 
recruits civilians especially for each mission. 
This creates delays and results in understaff-
ing of more dangerous missions, such as 
Afghanistan, which receive fewer applicants. 
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A possible solution is for the CSDP to try and 
create a civilian equivalent of battlegroups; 
multinational corps of development and 
institution-building experts who agree to be 
on standby for deployment when and where 
they might be needed. There will inevitably 
be roles which are unique to a certain area of 
operation which need to be filled ad hoc, but 
having a database of civilian personnel on 
standby for deployment could significantly 
increase the response time of the civilian 
CSDP and allow it to provide the numbers of 
personnel necessary to achieve lasting success.
Civilian CSDP missions are also unneces-
sarily delayed due to their funding procedure. 
In EU military missions the costs mostly ‘lie 
where they fall’, apart from some ‘common 
costs’ (such as running a mission HQ) which, 
as of 2011, are shared amongst states partici-
pating in the operations under the ‘ATHENA 
mechanism’.[40] However, civilian CSDP 
missions are funded by the European Com-
mission, as it is responsible for the financing 
of foreign aid. The negotiations required to 
secure funds from the Commission mean that 
civilian operations take longer to organise, 
reducing their effectiveness. The relationship 
between the Commission and the European 
Council, which ultimately controls the CSDP, 
is very complex and therefore so would be any 
solution for eliminating inefficiencies of their 
relationship. However, the speed of civilian 
CSDP operations could be increased by giving 
states the option of leading the mission and 
bearing the costs themselves, following the 
same procedure as military operations, until 
the Commission has decided to allocate funds.
Finally, the overall cohesion of civilian 
CSDP missions can be improved. The civilian 
and military missions in Bosnia and Herze-
govina since 2003 (EUPM and EUFOR Althea) 
were plagued by poor coordination, with the 
civilian and military missions competing for 
resources and not reinforcing each other. This 
shows that there needs to be an improvement 
in cooperation between the European Union 
Military Committee (EUMC) and Committee 
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM) which advises the CSDP’s Politi-
cal and Security Committee (PSC) on the 
military and civilian aspects of missions 
respectively. This could be achieved is by 
creating a permanent and dedicated CSDP 
Operational Headquarters. Such a facility has 
been suggested at various points by France 
but mainly for political reasons, such as the 
Tervuren Proposal in 2003 which aimed to 
create a non-NATO military headquarters in 
Europe to weaken American influence. Cur-
rently, CSDP missions either use their cell 
at the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, use 
national facilities of member states or, if all 
else fails, create a temporary headquarters 
in Belgium. Using the NATO headquarters 
is problematic for the same reason that all 
NATO-EU relations are problematic, namely 
due to the Turkey-Cyprus dispute. Using 
national or temporary headquarters does not 
allow for the possibility of long term planning 
operations by the EU Military Staff (EUMS) 
in anticipation of future crises. Britain’s 
usual objection to the idea of an independ-
ent permanent EU strategic headquarters 
is that it would unnecessarily duplicate 
SHAPE. However, a CSDP headquarters 
would only duplicate SHAPE if the CSDP 
and NATO were undertaking the same tasks. 
If the CSDP were to take over more respon-
sibilities from NATO, this would become 
less of an issue and increasingly necessary 
to respond to crises rapidly and coherently. 
The BCR states that the UK has tradition-
ally been against the idea of a dedicated EU 
operational HQ as it would be “duplica-
tive of existing structures [and] produce 
an unnecessary ambiguity with respect to 
the role of NATO”. However, the future of 
NATO is already deeply ambiguous and 
so diverting roles to the CSDP might leave 
NATO with a less ambiguous, smaller 
role consisting solely of the tasks which 
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it is best at, such as collective defence.
Defence spending
Since the start of the financial crisis in 2008, 
Western governments have drastically 
reduced all types of expenditure, including 
on defence. Methods of reducing military 
costs now form a crucial part of European 
security reviews and in a survey in April 
2013, 76 out of 100 European defence execu-
tives said that austerity was now the most 
important factor shaping European defence.
[41] In the SDSR, the UK government stated 
its intention to reduce the defence budget by 
8% and cut army personnel by 20% over the 
next five years, doubtlessly making it harder 
for the UK to achieve its security goals for 
which it is already under-resourced. Further-
more, within the EU as a whole, 60% of states 
reduced their defence expenditure in 2012 
with the total regional defence expenditure 
falling by 1.63%.[42] With Europe already 
suffering from a capability gap, as well the 
severe potential consequences of American 
reorientation, these cuts pose a large problem 
for European, and therefore British, security. 
As EUMC chairman General Hakan Syren 
worryingly stated, “the military capabili-
ties of the EU member states are on a steady 
downward slope… looking a few years into 
the future, it is simple mathematics to predict 
that many member states will be unable to 
sustain essential parts of their national forces, 
air forces being the prime example”.[43] 
In order for the UK and its EU allies to 
meet  their governments’ efficiency targets 
whilst undertaking the necessary improve-
ments in their armed forces without opening 
up new capabilities gaps, they must find 
ways of saving costs and economising in 
the least disruptive way possible. There 
is much room for improving efficiency in 
European militaries. Although the EU mem-
bers spend together over a third as much on 
defence as the US, they manage to acquire a 
far smaller fraction of its level of capability 
for that price. Some of the reasons for this 
can be seen by comparing how the US and 
European states spend their defence budgets. 
The US spends around 20.9% of its defence 
budget on personnel and 11.5% on research 
and development (R&D) while in the EU, 
50% of the budget is spend on personnel 
and only 4.3% on R&D.[44,45] The upside of 
these inefficiencies for Europe is that there is 
consequently considerable scope for mitigat-
ing the effects of decreased defence budgets 
through improving efficiency. Three methods 
of accomplishing this are pooling and sharing, 
budget coordination and joint procurement. 
Pooling and sharing
Currently, the EU has 28 different militaries, 
each with its own command structure, 
bureaucracy, procurement plans and mostly 
with its own army, navy and air force. This 
is deeply inefficient in the same way in 
which it would be for the US government to 
decide to break up its military into 50 state-
run militaries, which would each be made 
able to operate independently. Pooling and 
sharing are methods of overcoming these 
inefficiencies by reducing the duplication of 
capabilities of partaking countries. Pooling 
involves procuring equipment and conduct-
ing operations in tandem with other states 
while sharing involves states making their 
military resources available for other states 
to use. Pooling and sharing are far from new 
ideas, with already over 100 pooling and 
sharing programs in operation amongst EU 
and NATO members.[46] For example, in 
2010 the UK and France signed the Lancaster 
House Treaties and agreed to create a joint 
Anglo-French rapid response force and car-
rier group. Within the EU, the EDA facilitates 
many pooling and sharing initiatives such 
as the European Satellite Communication 
Procurement Cell (ESCPC) and joint pilot 
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training programs. NATO too has realised the 
importance of pooling and sharing, including 
‘smart defence’ in its most recent Strategic 
Concept which it defines as “a concept that 
encourages Allies to cooperate in developing, 
acquiring and maintaining military capabili-
ties to meet current security problems”.[47] 
The UK currently saves money through 
pooling and sharing programs conducted 
bilaterally, through NATO and through the 
EDA, and it should continue to do to maxim-
ise efficiency. The UK and France are natural 
partners for pooling and sharing due to their 
proximity and the similar size and capability 
of their militaries. Joint pooling and sharing 
projects between the two countries are most 
easily undertaken through direct agreements, 
rather than through the EDA (although obvi-
ously any initiative should be considered 
within a European context). Similarly, as 
long as the UK enjoys a special relation-
ship with the US, it should utilise as many 
pooling and sharing opportunities through 
NATO as possible, such as the Joint Strike 
Fighter project, to utilise America’s superior 
technology. However, being larger military 
powers with somewhat divergent interests 
to other EU members (such as protecting 
overseas territories), the UK and France will 
be unlikely to sacrifice significant levels of 
military autonomy through pooling until the 
economic incentive becomes overwhelming.
However, pooling and sharing through the 
EDA does have certain advantages over rely-
ing on NATO or ad hoc agreements. The EDA 
can serve as a “marriage-broker” between 
member states for pooling and sharing, as 
described by ADS (a British defence indus-
try trade organisation) in the BCR. Bilateral 
agreements only exist where there is already 
political will and the capability for pooling 
and sharing, which a specialised body like 
the EDA can help create. The EDA has a role 
in bringing pooling and sharing opportuni-
ties to the attention of states and assisting 
them in the process. For example, the EDA 
has been increasing military standardisation 
within Europe and has developed a code of 
conduct[48] for pooling and sharing shar-
ing which minimises friction between states 
that undertake cooperative military projects. 
Encouraging European militaries to save 
money by pooling and sharing, rather than 
entirely eliminating capabilities, will also 
reduce the countries’ operational dependence 
on the UK and France, who are the likely lead-
ers of future European military operations.
The EU also has an advantage over NATO 
for pooling and sharing due to the politi-
cal and economic aspects of joint initiatives. 
Pooling and sharing requires political guar-
antees that joint assets will be available when 
needed, as well as industrial standardisation. 
Due to the EU’s political and economic role, it 
is better equipped to support the non-military 
aspects of pooling and sharing initiatives. 
For example, the joint satellite communica-
tions project will have consequences for 
civilian telecommunications which the EU 
can deal with by itself. Therefore, in cases of 
supposed duplication between the EU and 
NATO, such as between the Multinational 
Aviation Training Centre and EU pilot train-
ing which is mentioned in the BCR, priority 
should be given to the EU initiative unless 
there is clear evidence that NATO performs 
the task better. However, the BCR notes that 
“it was also suggested that NATO’s perform-
ance in improving European capabilities has 
not been better than that of the EU”. A pos-
sible reason for the disappointing results of 
NATO’s smart defence is the lack of Ameri-
can support, due to its shift in priorities. 
Despite the many successful pooling 
and sharing programs which the EDA has 
undertaken, there is still much room for 
improvement. In 2009 EU members spent 
€24bn on national procurement but only 
€7bn on joint EU projects.[49] The EDA could 
achieve more if it was given greater pow-
ers to be more assertive, rather than simply 
advisory. For this to happen, there needs to 
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be more active input by national leaders, 
who so far have mostly left working out 
opportunities for pooling and sharing down 
to lower level staff. Greater political input 
would allow EU members to avoid the cur-
rent collective action problem in European 
defence, whereby almost all EU states support 
pooling and sharing in principle but do not 
want to take the first steps towards projects by 
themselves for fear of acting alone. Therefore, 
leaders should collectively demand that the 
EDA finds pooling and sharing opportuni-
ties and their militaries adopt them, with 
the same force that they have been able to 
demand that their militaries cut costs.
Budget coordination
The effects of the recent defence cuts have 
been exacerbated by the uncoordinated man-
ner in which they have been undertaken, with 
cost cutting often eclipsing military considera-
tions and many cost-saving measures being 
incoherent in themselves. An infamous recent 
example is the British government’s decision 
to replace the planned catapult-launched 
F-35C fighter jets with the F-35B Short Take-
off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant, to 
avoid the cost of fitting carriers with the cata-
pult system. However, equipping the planes 
with vertical landing gear greatly reduces 
their fuel capacity and therefore their range, 
increasing their cost of operation by requir-
ing more air-to-air refuelling. The swap also 
prevented carrier interoperability with France 
and America, whose fighters require the cata-
pult system and as French carriers are unable 
to take the weight of the heavier F-35B variant. 
Therefore, the decision scuppered the Anglo-
French joint-carrier group project which was 
included in the Lancaster House Treaties. 
Such ill-conceived measures could be 
prevented by greater budgetary consultation 
and mutual scrutiny between EU members to 
ensure that governments prioritise the least 
useful areas of their militaries for spend-
ing cuts so they have the smallest possible 
impact on military capability. The EU greatly 
overspends and is oversupplied in several 
military areas which, to use the EDA’s phras-
ing, need to be ‘rationalised’. For example, 
excessive spending on personnel has left 
Europe with a large number of troops who are 
poorly equipped and unable to be deployed 
overseas is clearly inefficient. Given the 
necessity for European states to work together 
on security and defence issues, the defence 
cuts of one state can have a severe impact 
on the capabilities of others. For example, 
the decision of Germany to reduce the size 
of its planned A400M transport aircraft fleet 
by 20 aircraft[50,51] is of severe concern to 
the EU as a whole, given the EDA’s current 
intentions of creating a combined European 
air transport fleet to plug one of the most 
important European military capability gaps. 
Regular consultation over the defence budgets 
could be achieved by introducing a ‘European 
defence semester’, as has been suggested 
repeatedly by former EDA chief executive 
Nick Witney.[52] This would be equivalent 
to the existing European economic semester 
whereby EU members allow their national 
budgets to be scrutinised by the commis-
sion, which gives them recommendations 
(although it currently has no power to make 
changes). A defence equivalent would allow 
states to review each other’s defence budgets 
and comment on potential capability gaps 
which could emerge from them. The interna-
tional exposure of national defence reviews 
would raise the political costs of placing 
national economic interest above interna-
tional security, as governments often do. 
A European defence semester would also 
allow states to coordinate their defence cuts, 
for example by ensuring that if one state 
was reducing air lift but protecting maritime 
surveillance development, that others would 
do the inverse. The result of such coordination 
would be ‘specialisation’, whereby states do 
not attempt to maintain a ‘full spectrum’ of 
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capabilities but instead focus their resources 
on areas in which they have special expertise. 
For larger European military powers, such as 
the UK and France, it is seen as a matter of 
pride to maintain a full spectrum and so they 
are unlikely to specialise to the same extent 
as smaller countries. However, the SDSR 
acknowledges that “we should look to our 
existing areas of comparative advantage... We 
can and will invest in all those areas where 
we are relatively stronger than other coun-
tries”, showing that the British government 
is already aware for the need to consider 
the country’s military capabilities within a 
context of contributing towards an alliance, 
rather than in isolation. During the Cold War, 
the US employed specialisation in NATO by 
being the main ISR provider, which it could 
perform better than any other state and so 
maximised the alliance’s capability, as well 
as increasing efficiency by being able to ‘ask’ 
other members to make other contributions 
instead. A very limited European military 
‘division of labour’ is already emerging with 
Lithuania offering water purification sup-
port for EU battlegroups and Greece offering 
sealift coordination. This could continue 
by the UK focusing on its strongest areas, 
such as intelligence, while diverting cuts 
other areas like airspace policing, which it 
is more efficient for to other states to do.
Procurement
Pooling and sharing is not only possible in 
operations and exercises, but can also take 
place in procurement by states developing 
and buying equipment together. The Euro-
pean defence market is currently deeply 
fragmented, with six times as many weapons 
systems being used by EU members as by 
the USA and order sizes being on average 
less than 1/5th of the size.[53] States tend 
to prefer to buy weapons domestically so as 
to support their own economies, even when 
buying from abroad would be cheaper. This 
is exacerbated by the considerable politi-
cal influence large defence conglomerates 
often have over their government, which 
allows them to ensure weapons are pur-
chased domestically at higher prices. 
Greater cooperation between European 
defence companies, especially BAE and 
EADS, in research efforts would lead to a 
smaller number of better designed weapons 
systems of which more would be produced 
with an economy of scale.  Doubling the vol-
ume of batch sizes has been seen to increase 
efficiency by around 20%.[54] The proposed 
merger between BAE and EADS would 
have provided an opportunity for a smaller 
number of larger, more efficient batches but 
it failed due to France, Germany and Brit-
ain being unable to agree on their relative 
stakeholders in the potential conglomerate. A 
smaller variety of European weapons systems 
would also facilitate pooling and sharing 
by reducing cross-compatibility issues.
Procurement costs could also be reduced 
by creating a common EU market for military 
equipment. This would increase competition 
between European defence companies and 
so reduce prices, as EU members would not 
be constrained to buy domestically. The EDA 
has already made progress in this area by 
creating an online European market board 
for surplus military equipment, over which 
€10bn worth of equipment has been sold.
[55] Increased competition between defence 
companies would also increase the incentive 
for them to cooperate, in order to compete 
with defence giants outside the EU such as 
Lockheed Martin or Boeing. The EDA could 
also assist EU members in finding the best 
value for money in military procurement 
by conducting defence supply audits. 
Some have even argued that creating a 
‘common European Industrial base’ would 
give Europe greater strategic independence, 
by reducing the ability of other states to issue 
arms embargos at times on conflict. The global 
defence economy is so integrated as to make it 
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impossible to totally equip one’s army without 
outside assistance. Any given weapons system 
will usually consist of mechanical parts pro-
duced in the USA and electronics produced 
in China or Japan. However, maximising 
the European role in equipping European 
militaries would give Britain more scope for 
control over its supply and greater security 
against future disruptions to its supply. 
Protecting global power
Military capabilities are not only instrumen-
tal in promoting its interests but can also 
be ends in themselves. Despite having lost 
its 19th century imperial status, Britain still 
perceives itself to be an important global 
actor. This perception is somewhat justified 
by being in an exclusive group of states with 
a permanent seat on the UN security council, 
an independent nuclear arsenal and a global 
network of military bases which allow it to, as 
the SDSR proudly states, “continue to be one 
of very few countries able to deploy a self-
sustaining, properly equipped brigade-sized 
force anywhere around the world and sustain 
it indefinitely”. However, Britain’s position as 
a world power is under considerable pres-
sure. Countries like Brazil, China and India 
are enjoying rapid economic growth, which 
is allowing them to increase the scope and 
range of their interests. Their greater power is 
increasingly calling into question why Britain 
(and for the same reasons France) are P5 - UN 
Security Council permanent members whilst 
India, Japan and Germany are not, essen-
tially due to their misfortune of not being in 
a position of strength at the time of the UN’s 
creation. Within the EU, Germany is becom-
ing more assertive and prepared to wield its 
economic pre-eminence to pursue its inter-
ests, although mainly in economic matters. 
British eurosceptics often argue that the 
UK’s position within the EU weakens its 
global position by transferring sovereignty 
to Brussels and reducing its scope for actions 
such as joining the US in its pivot towards 
Asia. This is somewhat true for the suprana-
tional aspects of the EU, such as trade policy 
although it ignores the influence which British 
businesses gain by being able to shape inter-
national commercial and industrial standards 
and having their voice magnified on a global 
scale.[56] However, due to the perpetual need 
for consensus, the CSDP is strictly intergov-
ernmental and does not infringe on Britain’s 
sovereignty as it can simply veto any policy 
with which it disagrees.[57] However, as 
has been mentioned throughout, by being 
part of the CSDP Britain gains the ability to 
greatly expand its capabilities and influence 
in a way which is viewed with significantly 
less suspicion than other security actors, 
such as NATO. Furthermore, if a reformed 
EU is able to expand its global power, a more 
involved UK would reap many of rewards.
The EU has the potential to become the 
primary external actor in North Africa, due 
to its proximity and developmental capabili-
ties. Also, by being able to guarantee security 
in North Africa after the on-going period of 
political upheaval, the EU could fulfil a role 
similar to that of NATO in Eastern Europe 
after the Cold War. NATO oversaw the 
security of Eastern European states while 
they underwent political transition, as well 
as helping reform their armed forces, for 
example by placing them under civilian 
control. In doing so, American influence in 
Eastern Europe was greatly increased. By 
being one of the most proactive members 
within the CSDP, the UK has the opportu-
nity to similarly provide assistance while 
increasing influence in Northern Africa. 
However, as Merlingen states, without 
a more coherent security policy, the EU 
will continue to have the behaviour of a 
“small power”[58] on security matters, like 
Canada or the Netherlands, despite having a 
GDP and population that exceeds the USA. 
Unless the EU becomes a ‘United States of 
Europe’, its lack of a unified foreign policy 
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will inevitably be a hindrance. However, this 
handicap should be minimised to maximise 
European influence. As Harvard professor 
Stanley Hoffmann stated in 1999, “Europe 
must not remain an economic giant and a 
diplomatic and military dwarf; in the long 
run its weakness in the latter domains will 
sap its forces in the other”.[59] The EU’s 
failure to assert its interests internationally is 
already harming its members, with European 
states losing voting rights in international 
bodies to East Asian countries (often with 
American assistance).[60] A more proactive 
CSDP not only gives the EU greater ability to 
promote its interests, but has symbolic value. 
As Nick Witney states, force is still the “lin-
gua franca”[61] in many parts of the world, 
such as East Asia and the Middle East. For 
Europe to compete for influence with China 
and India, which are rapidly increasing their 
military strength, the EU needs to prove itself 
as an equal by being able to provide security 
assistance to countries in unstable regions.
Given that the EU has mostly economic 
relationships with the USA and other 
superpowers such as China and Russia, the 
most significant ways in which the EU can 
strengthen its relative position is by acting 
more decisively and with more cohesion on 
economic matters, rather than security ones. 
However, global economic interdependence is 
demonstrably reversible and there is always 
the possibility that economic collapse might 
cause states to return to a system of realist 
power maximisation policies. In such a case, 
European states would need to able to act 
together to defend themselves from external 
threats and to protect their interests, for which 
military power is integral and so a more 
militaried EU would provide an insurance. 
Finally, military integration would 
strengthen Britain’s position within the EU. 
The British government’s reticence about the 
country’s future in the Union is leading to 
increasing frustration from other members 
such as France and Germany, and the UK 
risks becoming marginalised within the EU 
by the more proactive members, especially 
Germany which has by far the greatest eco-
nomic power. However, in military matters 
the UK is able to play a far more pivotal 
role than it can in economic matters and 
has scope to exercise leadership, due to its 
military expertise and pre-eminent capabili-
ties. If the EU became more concerned with 
security matters, the strengthened position 
of the UK could translate to other areas, such 
as economic policy, and give the UK more 
bargaining power when determining the 
future of the EU with Germany and France. 
Inversely, if the UK abstains from EU mili-
tary cooperation, it risks being marginalised 
while France enjoys the benefits of leading the 
military aspects of the EU. In sum, military 
integration offers the UK a way to assume a 
more important role within the EU which will 
then magnify its global position, as well as 
magnifying the global power of the EU itself.
Conclusion
The UK had a fundamental role in driving 
the wave of European defence and security 
cooperation at the start of the 21st century. 
Austerity, US realignment and new varieties of 
threats necessitate that it does so again. There 
are several main ways in which the EU is of 
fundamental importance to British security:
• The EU’s civilian capabilities, such as 
cooperation with judiciaries and law 
enforcement are necessary for the UK to 
effectively address the causes of terror-
ism and provide a more thorough defence 
against cyber-attacks and organised crime.
• The EU’s developmental and state-
building capabilities are necessary for 
the UK to ensure stability and security in 
areas of importance overseas, especially 
where it has failed to do so with NATO.
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• The EU’s softer, value-driven image allows 
the UK to partake in missions in politically 
sensitive areas, such as Africa and the Cau-
cuses. It also facilitates cooperation with 
other states and security organisations and 
reduces resentment from the population in 
the areas of intervention. 
• The EDA and battlegroups are needed 
for other EU member states to overcome 
their military capability gaps and become 
more compatible with the British military, 
making overseas operations less burden-
some for the UK and more effective.
• The EDA is needed for the UK to meet its 
austerity goals through pooling and shar-
ing and by encouraging and facilitating 
other EU members to do the same, instead 
of sacrificing their military capabilities.
In order for the EU to become an effective 
security provider to the UK, Europe, and parts 
of the world which seek its assistance, it must  
undergo several reforms. The most important  
being to:
• Create a new European Security Strategy  
to codify Europe’s strategic priorities, the  
circumstances in which it would launch  
operations and how these operations  
should be undertaken. This would allow  
the full utilisation of the CSDP and its  
battlegroups.
• In the event of a lack of consensus, allow  
CSDP to intervene in conflicts through 
voluntary ‘directorates’ of EU members.  
A civilian equivalent could be used in the  
case of delays in the Commission allocating 
funds.
• Create a CSDP civilian ‘corps’ of personnel  
ready to be deployed, to overcome slow  
operational deployment and personnel  
shortages.
• Create a dedicated Operational Headquar-
ters for the CSDP to increase its speed of 
reaction to crises and level of coordination 
between EU military and civilian missions.
• Give the EDA greater political power to 
ensure pooling and sharing targets are met 
by closer supervision by national leaders.
• Create a ‘European Defence Semester’ so 
that states can scrutinise and coordinate 
their defence budgets to minimise the over-
all effects of defence austerity and allow for 
greater efficiency though specialisation.
• Create a common EU defence market to 
reduce procurement costs and encour-
age more EU-wide development projects 
to achieve better value for money.
These reforms would have the cumulative 
effect of creating a more capable and asser-
tive EU with the UK in a more prominent 
position. This would increase the power and 
influence of the UK within EU and the EU 
in the world. This in turn increases the UK’s 
overall global power and influence which is 
vitally important to protecting its interests 
in the future. However, even with a stronger 
EU, both the UK and the CSDP would still 
need to exercise caution when pursuing a 
more active security role. There will always 
be the risk of the CSDP becoming overcon-
fident and undertaking a mission which is 
beyond its capabilities. An ‘EU Vietnam’ 
which required an American bailout would 
enormously damage the EU’s credibility as a 
security actor and drain the momentum for 
future development in security cooperation.
Lastly, the importance of the CSDP for the 
UK does not mean that NATO is redundant 
and the Alliance still has several clear advan-
tages over the CSDP, with 60% of Europeans 
continuing to see NATO as essential for 
European security, according to the 2010 
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Transatlantic Trends survey . These advan-
tages include providing collective defence 
and undertaking the higher-intensity combat 
aspects of overseas intervention. NATO also 
serves as a method of slowing the US pivot 
away from in Europe, which is a cause for 
concern as long as Europeans suffer from 
capability gaps.  However, as Europe develops 
its military capabilities and the US becomes 
more detached, NATO will lose its advan-
tages over the CSDP and, potentially go the 
same way as the WEU and be incorporated 
into the EU (although of course this would 
require creative methods of maintaining 
cooperation with non-EU NATO members, 
particularly the US). However, such events 
are only a remote possibility. Although it 
requires some significant changes in the years 
to come, the EU and CSDP have the potential 
to play a crucial role in ensuring the protec-
tion of both the UK and its national interests, 
as well as the security of Europe as a whole.
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